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L INTRODUCTION
[A brief two-page introductory statement outlining the gravity of the situation and
the need to include articles on the protection and preservation of the ecosystems of
international watercourses will precede the following discussion.]
The Commission's task is "the promotion of the progressive development of
international law and its codification."' The task of this paper is to comment on the
draft articles included as Parts IV and V and an article included among miscellaneous
r-\	 provisions. Part IV is entitled "Protection and Preservation." It prescribes the obligations
of watercourse states concerning "protection and preservation" of the ecosystems of
international watercourses (article 20); prevention, reduction and control of pollution
(article 21); introduction of alien or new species (article 22); and protection and
preservation of the marine environment (article 23). Part V, entitled, "Harmful
Conditions and Emergency Situations," includes international watercourse states'
obligations to prevent or mitigate harmful conditions (article 24); and obligations
concerning notification and cooperation in emergency situations (article 25). Among
miscellaneous provisions, article 29 addresses questions concerning the protection and use
of international watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict. The discussion
in the paper follows the organization of the Commission's draft.
H. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ARTICLES
A. ARTICLE 20
Article 20 lays down a general obligation for watercourse states "to protect and
preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses." In doing so, this draft article
exemplifies the generally progressive, and welcome, nature of the overall efforts
embodied- in these articles. In particular, this article can be seen as part of the effort to
codify a more 'holistic' approach to the law of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses.'
1. The Concept of "Ecosystem"
Article 20 obligates watercourse states to consider their non-navigational uses of
international watercourses in terms of the effect upon the "ecosystem" of the
international watercourse. The article itself does not define the term "ecosystem," nor is
it defined in article 2, where the terms "international watercourse," "watercourse" and
"watercourse state" are clarified. The International Law Commission (ILC) provides a
definition of an ecosystem in the commentary on article 20, stating that the term "refers
to an ecological unit consisting of living and non-living components that are
interdependent and function as a community."'
The use of the term "ecosystem" reflects relatively recent changes in the draft
articles by the ILC. The Special Rapporteur's fourth report in 1988, which included the
initial draft language for this article, did not contain the term "ecosystem".4 The
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language suggested by the Special Rapporteur spoke in terms of protecting "the
environment of an international watercourse [system], including the ecology of the
watercourse and of surrounding areas."5
During discussions of the draft article by the ILC in 1988, the suggestion was
made that the ILC consider including "a definition of the expression 'environment of an
international watercourse' in a future introductory article so as to make it clear that the
ecology or ecosystems of international watercourses were also covered:6 Other
comments underscored the desire of 1LC members to bring "greater clarity" to the object
of the article, "the environment of an international watercourse."'
In response to these comments, the Special Rapporteur noted that the article, as
drafted, intended to show that "ecology" was included within the broader concept
"environment." However, the article was not intended to cover the entire environment
beyond that of international watercourses!
If we look back at the history of the concept "ecosystem," we would probably
agree that, with one exception, the definition provided in the commentary on article 20 is
clear and reflects the holistic sense of the term as it is generally used. The concept of
"ecosystem" first appeared in the U.S. scientific literature in the mid-1930s. In his 1935
article, Professor Tansley suggested that an ecosystem was "the whole system (in the
sense of physics), including not only the organism-complex, but also the whole complex of
physical factors forming what we call the environment of the biome -- the habitat factors
in the widest sense:6
A more formal definition proposed in 1942 by Raymond Lindeman suggested that
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an ecosystem should be considered as: "the system composed of physical-chemical- 	 (Th
biological processes active within a space-time unit of any magnitude, j, the biotic
community pLug its abiotic community."° More recent scientific writing on ecosystems
mirrors this latter definition. For example, the Ehrlichs state that "an ecosystem is the
functional unit that includes both biotic (living) and abiotic (nonliving) elements." The
emphasis on systems is notable in all of these definitions.
The one significant difference between this latter definition and the definition
provided by the ILC is the reference in the commentary's definition to an ecosystem as
an ecological unit which is interdependent and functions "as a community.' At least in
biological terms, the use of this phrase adds nothing that is not already present in the
concept of an ecosystem. In ecological terms, a "community" is a subset of the ecosystem
in which the community is situated.° The two represent different levels of biological
analysis.° Therefore, it would be helpful if the commentary were modified to clarify
this unnecessary source of confusion.
The concept of ecosystem has seen slow and uneven progress in the level of its
acceptance into the arena of environmental law. For example, there has been a gap
between the acceptance of the concept in the scientific community and the domestic
acceptance of the term into U.S. environmental law. The use of the concept in U.S.
public land policy was suggested as early as 1970 by Lynton Caldwell.° Yet, twenty
years later, commentators would be lamenting that U.S. federal land managers still had
no "legal obligation ... to protect shared ecosystem resources."
In the context of international agreements, although there have been an increasing
4
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number of calls for ecosystem management of international watercourses,' it is only in
the last decade that the concept has begun to appear in the language of international
documents and resolutions. The United Nations Environment Program in its ten year
review recognized this need, noting that the period from 1972-1982 had seen "increasing
recognition of the needj for better management of water resources by treating river basins
as unitary systems.'
However, the concept was slow to be incorporated into actual international
agreements. As noted by the ILC," the term "eco-system" was used in the 1978
Agreement between Canada and the United States on Great Lakes Water Quality, where
"thereference is made to 0 m  Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.' 20 Explicit use of the term
"ecosystem" appears also in a few documents such as the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 21 the World Charter for Nature,"
and a few regional agreements.'
As can be seen from these examples, the use of the term "ecosystem" has
generally been limited to those agreements which addressed wildlife resources and
biodiversity issues, not the use of international watercourses specifically."
The increasing u lSage of the ecosystem concept, as evidenced by these
international agreements, as well as the draft articles themselves, is indicative of the
trend towards more regional-based management efforts.' Article 20 is fully consistent
with this trend. The ILC recognizes this broadening of focus, noting that the emphasis
on protection and preservation of ecosystems intended by this article is part of a larger
recognition by states of the necessity to protect ecological processes rather than just
individual species or discrete attributes of the environment' s As noted by Professor
Odum, "the concept of the ecosystem is and should be a broad one, its main function in
ecological thought being to emphasize obligatory relationships, interdependence and
causal relationships.' Under such a broad definition, the emphasis on flood control,
apportionment, or hydropower generation which has dominated previous international
agreements concerning international watercourses would no longer be the only concerns
of such agreements. 28 This increased breadth encompassed by the ecosystem conept
means both increased applicability and increased complexity in that application.
2. Some Implications of the Ecosystem Concept
a. Defining the Limits.
The ILC notes that it "preferred to utilize the term 'ecosystem' [rather than the
term "environment", which was originally suggested, because it] believed [the term] to
have a more precise scientific and legal meaning."29 The ILC felt that the term
"environment" "could be interpreted quite broadly, to apply to areas 'surrounding' the
watercourses that have minimal bearing on the protection and preservation of the
watercourse itself.' While the commentary rightly suggests that the term "ecosystem"
is subject to more "precise" scientific definition than "environment," it is not as clear to
this observer that the use of the term "ecosystem" will, in fact, lead to more legal
precision.
For example, the question of defining the boundaries of the ecosystem of an
international watercourse will still require the exercise of considerable discretion on the
part of those grappling with the reality of inadequate data or conflicting interpretations
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of data. Article 2(b) of these draft articles defines the term "watercourse" as "a system of
surface and underground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a
unitary whole and flowing to . a common terminus." In the commentary on this language,
ILC makes clear that goundwater, so long as it is interrelated with surface waters, forms
part of the watercourse.m
Yet, the determinations whether (a) a proposed action will appreciably affect the
groundwater at issue, or (b) the groundwater actually is physically connected with the
.
surface water, may mvolve questions of significant practical uncertainty. For example,
the recent United Nations study on groundwater in Eastern and Northern Europe is
replete with statements indicating the need for additional information concerning
groundwater resources in those countries.32
Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine the discussion that might arise concerning
whether a particular species of waterfowl that migrates through a country, spending only
a short while on the watercourse is, in fact, part of the watercourse ecosystem.33
Perhaps the response in such cases is that this question of the boundary of an
ecosystem must be vieWed in light of the extent to which there may be appreciable harm,
under article 7 of the draft articles. As noted by the ILC, the appreciable harm standard
inquiry "embodies a factual standard [with the] harm [ ] capable of being established by
objective evidence."34 To the extent that the location of the ecosystem boundary is not
determinable, the likelihood that the harm will be appreciable is also likely to be
correspondingly diminished. Nevertheless, caution seems in order with regard to the
hope that increased pre icision in defining the limits of the area to be considered will
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result from the use of the concept "ecosystem."
This discussion contains strains of that which attended the debate over whether to
use the phrase "drainage basin," "watercourse system," or just "watercourse.' Some
states objected to the use of the "drainage basin" concept because they viewed it as
applying to land areas as well.
The use of the "ecosystem" concept would appear responsive to those concerns, in
that ecosystems are defined in terms of (usually observable) interrelationships and not
directly on the basis of geography. Again, as expressed by Professor Odum, it is the
presence of major components that "operate together to achieve some sort of functional
stability" that is the key to defining the concept of ecosystem, and not geographic
factors.36 Therefore, article 20 rightly places the focus on systems or relationships,
rather than geography, thereby ameliorating fears that unrelated lands will be subject to
the application of the article."
b. Breadth of Application
The breadth of the application of the concept of "ecosystem" intended by the ILC
is illustrated in the commentary on article 20. The ILC notes that "an external impact
affecting one Component of an ecosystem causes reactions among other components and
may disturb the equilibrium of the entire ecosystem.' The ILC goes on to recognize
that such an impact "may impair or destroy the ability of an ecosystem to function as a
life-support system.'
Two comments are in order here. First, the concept of an "ecosystem" does not
distinguish between the human species and other species, whether plant or animal. Again,
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as stated by Professor Odum, "[p]opulations of men [sic], like other populations, are a
part of larger units, Le. biotic communities and ecosystems."° Assuming that both
humans and non-human species actually live in or use the international watercourse
under consideration, then all should be considered part of the ecosystem. The language
used by the ILC -- that' impacts on one component cause reactions among other
components -- is entirely consistent with this view.
Therefore, the use of the ecosystem concept in article 20 continues the trend
noted earlier to focus more broadly on larger ecological units, such as habitats or
drainage units, and less on specific components of those habitats or units. In so doing,
the article represents a rebalancing of the role of humans relative to the rest of the
biosphere, with other species and elements of the biosphere being afforded increased
importance. Such a rebalancing parallels changes and discussions in the U.S.
environmental law area' and should be viewed as a positive step forward in the effort
to treat causes rather than symptoms of environmental degradation.
Second, the focus in article 20 on ecological processes draws attention to the
dynamic and changing nature of interactions between human communities and the other
elements of the ecosystems of which they are a part. These intereactions are not static;
they change through tiMe as human populations change in size, if for no other reason.42
This has both positive and negative aspects.
The article 20 obligation is phrased in terms of protecting and preserving the
ecosystems of international watercourses. The ILC states that the verb "protect"
"requires that watercouise states shield the ecosystems of international watercourses from
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harm or damage."' The verb "protect" implies that the current condition of an
ecosystem is considered desireable to maintain. Therefore, it is prospective in
application, unlike article 21, for example, which explicitly addresses situations where
states have an obligation to clean up current degradation resulting from pollution."
Likewise, the verb "preserve" implies protection of the current condition, whatever that
may be, although the ILC notes that it intended the obligation to preserve to apply "in
particular to freshwater ecosystems that are in pristine or unspoiled condition."5
However, many international watercourse ecosystems are currently in degraded
states from the standpoint of soil erosion resulting from deforestation, decreases in
biological diversity, and the like." It is not clear that article 21 would apply to
situations involving the rectification of current ecosystem degradation, where that
degradation does not fall within customary definitions of pollution. This represents a
potential problem with the article as it is currently drafted and could perhaps be clarified
in the commentary.
As to the article's positive potential, to 'protect' and 'preserve' the ecosystem of
an international watercourse implies a breadth of consideration that will prospectively
direct the attention of watercourse states to the broader causes of ecosystem degradation,
poverty and increased population being two of the most significant. As noted by the ILC,
"[t]he obligation to protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses
addresses this problem [of unsustainable development], which is already acute in some
parts of the world."' In that sense, this article contains a very positive potential for
engaging the attention of watercourse states with regard to these issues.
CM
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c. fluctuations in Quantity
Given the very thorough discussion in the commentary on the draft articles of
their meaning and intent, as a whole, it is somewhat puzzling that the word "quantity" is
not mentioned in the commentary on article 20. 4 Yet fluctuations or changes in the
quantity of water in a watercourse often have significant consequences for a
watercourse's ecosystem. The building of a dam can often be the single most significant
negative impact on the ecosystdm of an international watercourse!' In this context, the
recommendation made by the OECD that "Nile quantitative relationship between water
quality and quantity must be thoroughly evaluated prior to a management decision"s°
bears listening to.
It is not clear fr iom the commentary why this concept is omitted. However, if one
takes the language of article 20 seriously, then the expected physical consequences of a
project, such as a dam, or any significant diversion of water from an international
watercourse, would need to be looked at very carefully in terms of the mandate to
protect and preserve the ecosystem of international watercourses provided in article 20.
B. ARTICLE 21
The commentary to article 21 claims that the article finds a broad support in state
practice, as evidenced in treaties, decisions of international tribunals, and the work of
international organizations. Scholarly organizations, especially the International Law
Association and the Institute of International Law have made enormous contributions to
the subject in their ongoing studies. Recently, the Experts Groups on Environmental
Law of the World Comnussion on Environment and Development (WCED) drafted legal
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principles for environmental protection and sustainable development. The growing
worldwide concern with environmental degradation and pollution is reflected in the
urgency with which states are willing to address the issue. The upcoming 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development evidences this concern.
1. Definition of Pollution
Article 21, paragraph 1, defines "pollution" of an international watercourse to
mean "any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an
international watercourse which results directly or indirectly from human conduct."
a. General
In general, the term "pollution" has lacked a precise definition under international
law." It is only in a specific and yet contextual setting in which the term is to be
applied, for example, pollution of water, air, watercourse, et cetera so that its meaning
can be discerned, and then only by reference to "scientific standards and criteria by which
it could be precisely determined in what sense a specific environment can be regarded as
impaired and at what point the impairment should be regarded as intolerable: 52 The
definition assumes significance for the determination of the rights and obligations of
states which derive from the permissibility or impermissibility of certain acts or omissions
causing "pollution."
The starting point in defining water pollution is the 1966 Report of the
International Law Association's (ILA's) Committee on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers, which was adopted by the ILA at its Helsinki Conference in
1966." Widely known as the Helsinki Rules, Rules IX-XI address the topic of
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pollution.TM" "Water pollution" in the Helsinki Rules "refers to any detrimental change
resulting from human Conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the
waters of an international drainage basin."55
The definition Was limited to description, as it specifically referred to "the physical
alteration in the natural quality or content of the water."56 Deliberately excluded were
the legal incidents of such alterations.
Although the Report considered it "advisable to adopt a definition of pollution
comprehending any detrimental alteration in the natural composition or quality of the
water irrespective of its effects on subsequent users,"" in the next article it linked the
impermissible legal threshold of pollution to the principle of "equitable utilization."" It
explained:
The concept of equitable utilization of the waters of an international
drainage basin has the purpose of promoting. . . an accommodation [of
the multiple and diverse uses of the co-basin States]. Thus, uses of the
waters by a basin State that causes pollution resulting in injury in a co-basin
State must be considered from the overall perspective of what constitutes
an equitable utilization."
The threshold adopted was that of substantial injury or damage. ® Injury or damage to
the environment independent of its effects on subsequent users was disregarded.
Six years later, at the New York meeting in 1972, the Committee presented draft
articles on "Marine Pollution of Continental Origin," which enunciated a state's obligation
to prevent any existing sea-water pollution "which would cause substantial injury in the
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territory of another State or to any of its rights under international law or to the marine
environment."' In the commentary, the Report noted increasing support for the
protection of maritime waters "and the flora and fauna living [there] in the interest of
all." However, in its 1982 report which elaborated the Helsinki Rules the Committee
stuck to its earlier position that impermissible water pollution is to be determined by the
measure of its causing "substantial injury in the territory of another state."3
b. Harm to the Environment of the Watercourse States
By the mid-1970s, several conventions used an expanded definition of "pollution"
to include "harm to marine life" and "reduction of amenities," as in the Convention on
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area" and the Convention
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution," and "harm to marine
eco-systems," as in the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-
Based Sources." Finally, the definition of "pollution of the marine environment" in the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea includes "harm to . . . marine life," and
"reduction of amenities."
During the last two decades, there has been an enhanced appreciation for the
environment, especially so since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment which declared in Principle 21 states' obligations "to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' The concern derives from
our greater awareness and understanding of the interrelatedness between human beings
and the environment. In specifically including harm to the environment of watercourse
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states as impermissible pollution," the 1LC Draft appropriately reflects and
r"-\	 acknowledges these developments.
c. Change in the Ouantity of Water
The definition of "pollution" in article 21 again fails to refer to a change in the
quantity of water as constituting pollution. One could perhaps read into the "quality"
component of the definition an implicit reference to the quantity, for a change in the
volume, velocity or turbulence of the water might involve water pollution." The
commentary, however, provides little help on the issue: while suggesting that it is
difficult and perhaps even undesirable to define "quality" with precision," the only
specific reference under quality is to "the essential nature and degree of purity of
water." The commentary is otherwise thorough in defining and explaining what is
included or excluded from a particular term and why. Therefore, the conclusion seems
inescapable that while the quantity of water could certainly be considered as an integral
component of the Draft's "equitable utilization" concept?' it is excluded from the
determination of "water pollution" under the Draft.
Whatever considerations might have prompted this exclusion, changes in the
quantity of water in a watercourse adversely affect the natural assimilation process. As
Professor Davis explains:
Diversion of water for irrigation, manufacturing, and public water supply
can reduce the flow available to an amount less than the minimum required
for natural waste assimilative processes. Unless the volume and
concentration of treated and untreated waste discharges can be reduced or
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the streamflow increased, the wastes will overwhelm the assimilative
	 cm
processes of the stream. That process will result in insufficient or zero
oxygen levels in the water, fish kills and odors. An appropriate balance
between streamflow and waste discharges is essential to a healthy
stream.'
d. Detrimental Alteration
The final comment on the definition of pollution relates to the reference in article
21 to "any detrimental alteration." Unlike some other definitions such as the one used in
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which include a risk of such alteration
by adding the "likely to result in ... harm" language,' article 21 seemingly rejects that
risk-based approach.
Granted, the second paragraph of article 21 specifically obligates watercourse
states to "prevent, reduce and control pollution of an international watercourse that may
cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States or to their environment," and the
commentary explains that the duty to prevent harm includes the duty to prevent the
threat of such harm.' Here, the commentary refers back to the watercourse states'
obligation to protect ecosystems under article 20, explaining that "the principle of
precautionary action is applicable, especially in respect of dangerous substances such as
those that are toxic, persistent or bioaccumulative."" This approach, however, reflects a
half-hearted acceptance of the risk factor, without acknowledging that the risk, or
perhaps "significant risk," of detrimental alteration constitutes pollution.
There is certainly precedent for such rejection of a risk-based approach in the
16
ILA's 1982 Draft Articles intended to elaborate the Helsinki Rules. There, the ILA
Committee on International Water Resources Law rejected the suggestion to include
conduct that "is likely to result in" harm.28 In its comment, the Committee said: "The
view that Article IX of the Helsinki Rules should be widened to conform with these
definitions [which include the "likely to result in" harm language] was rejected by the
Committee on the ground that pollution is a fact and not an apprehended state of
affairs."28
The argument i4 not persuasive. As the WCED Experts Group on Environmental
Law explicitly stated in their proposed article 10, states are obligated to "prevent or abate
any transboundary environmental interference or a significant risk thereof which causes
substantial harm,"8° and in article 11 on liability for transboundary interference resulting
r-\
	 from lawful activities," and as the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
explicitly states, 82 it seems desirable for the PLC to have included the risk of harm in the
definition of pollution.
In paragraphs 2and 3, the ILC Draft builds on the pertinent existing conventions
and state practice. Paragraph 2 prescribes the threshold for impermissible pollution. As
noted above,83 it includes a watercourse state's obligation to prevent, reduce and control
pollution which causes harm to the environment, among other harms. The commentary
explains that the reference to the environment encompasses, in particular, matters such
as the living resources of the international watercourse, flora and fauna dependent on it,
and the amenities connected with it, such as recreation and tourism." A footnote adds
that appreciable pollution harm to a watercourse state's environment could also
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encompass harm to human health.' Thus the term "environment" is appropriately
viewed by the ILC to be broader than the "ecosystem" concept used earlier in article
20." This treatment of the environmental harm is in conformity with other such recent
formulations."1
2. The Concept of Appreciable Harm
Article 2(2) imposes an affirmative obligation on states. What is prohibited under
the article is harm. However, not all harm is proscribed; the standard used is that of
"appreciable harm." The modifier "appreciable" is introduced earlier under draft article
3, and the standard of appreciable harm is spelled out under draft article 7 which
obligates watercourse states to "utilize an international watercourse in such a way as not
to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States."
Article 3, which applies to watercourse agreements, states that such an agreement,
which it also defines, "does not adversely affect, to an appreciable extent, the use by one
or more other watercourse States of the waters of the international watercourse."' The
commentary explains that by "appreciable" adverse effects is meant "a real impairment of
use," that is, capable of being established by objective evidence. It distinguishes the
term "appreciable" from "substantial," stating that to be termed "appreciable," the adverse
effect "need not rise to the level of being substantial.""
The commentary refers to the Lake Lanoux case (between Spain and France, in
which Spain challenged the French plan of diversion of water from Lake Lanowc,
claiming such diversion to be a violation of prior treaty arrangements),91 in which the
arbitral tribunal held that, in the absence of any assertion that Spanish interests were
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affected in a tangible way, Spain could not require maintenance of the natural flow of the
waters. The tribunal said:
[Tjhanks to the restitution effected by the devices described above, none of
the guaranteed users will suffer in his enjoyment of the waters ... ; at the
lowest water level, the volume of the surplus waters of the Carol, at the
boundary, will at no time suffer a diminution; ... .92
The commentary to draft article 7 explains that the governing rule of that article,
mandating that the utilization of an international watercourse by a watercourse state
must not cause "appreciable harm" to other watercourse states, is an application of the
maxim sic utere tuo ut talienum non laedas (use your own property so as not to injure
the property of others), which itself reflects the sovereign equality of states. 93 The
obligation, which extends as well to the conduct of private entities operating in a state,'
is to prohibit not all harm, but "appreciable" harm, a term bearing the same meaning as
in draft articles 3 and 4.
The commentary adds:
The harm must 1:ie capable of being established by objective evidence.
There must be a real impairment of use, i.e. a detrimental impact of some
consequence upon, for example, public health, industry, property,
agriculture or the environment in the affected State. "Appreciable" harm is
therefore that which is not insignificant or barely detectable, but is not
necessarily "serious." The passages from the arbitral award in the Lake
Lanoux case discussed in the commentary to article 3 are also pertinent
19
here."
Two comments are in order: one concerns the choice of "harm" over "injury," and
the other concerns the choice of the adjective "appreciable." In the view of this
commentator, both choices are commendable.
a. Harm vs. Injury
The Helsinki Rules prescribe the standard of "substantial injury" for the
determination of the proscribed state conduct concerning water pollution in an
international drainage basin. 96 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (Restatement) also uses the term "injury" to signify prohibited state
conduct." However, the Special Rapporteur proposed, and the Commission accepted,
his preference for the factual standard of harm because of its clarity, instead of the legal
concept of injury."
b. "Appreciable" vs. "Substantial" or "Significant"
The ILC selected "appreciable" among the many qualifying terms frequently used
to modify "harm", such as substantial, significant, sensible (in French and Spanish), and
appreciable, because it concluded that among these terms, "appreciable provides the
most objective and factual standard." " In the commentary, for illustrative purposes,
the Commission enumerates several international instruments which employ the
expression "appreciable harm," or its functional equivalent in French and Spanish, which
is "sensible."10°
The ILC choice of "appreciable" is noteworthy, especially in light of the use of the
term "substantial" both by ILA and the WCED's Experts Group on Environmental Law.
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To illustrate, the 1966 Helsinki Rules employ the modifier "substantial"' and the ILA
followed the same nomenclature in its 1982 Rules, revising the Helsinki Rules,'
"taking into account developments in theory and practice since 1966:4°3 The suggested
rule drafted by the WCED's Experts Group would obligate states to "prevent or abate
any transboundary environmental interference or a significant risk thereof which causes
substantial harm -- i.e. harm which is not minor or insignificant."
As to what constitutes "appreciable" harm, the ILC explained that it is "that which
is not insignificant or barely detectable, but is not necessarily `serious." 443 As already
noted, the WCED's EXperts Group on Environmental Law also explained that
"substantial" harm is "harm which is not minor or insignificant."' Is the difference
between these terms then simply a matter of semantics? Perhaps so, but the ILC's intent
is clear when it states in the commentary that for the adverse effect to be appreciable, it
"need not rise to the level of being substantial."'" Thus, measured in terms of the
degree of harm, the lover threshold standard of impermissible pollution prescribed under
the ILC Draft is a positive step forward.
3. Prevention, Reduction and Control of Pollution
The affirmative 'obligation of watercourse states to "prevent, reduce and control"
such impermissible pollution is elaborated in the commentary to article 21(2). The 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea uses the same formula in relation to marine
pollution.'" As the commentary explains, prevention relates to new pollution "from
existing or planned activities, such as factories, sewage disposal systems, or irrigation
projects, to the extent that such pollution 'may cause appreciable harm to other
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watercourse States or to their environment.'"° 9 The obligation extends "to prevent the
threat of such harm," for the obligation is to prevent pollution which "may cause"
appreciable harm. By referring to article 20, the commentary adds that "the principle of
precautionary action is applicable, especially in respect of dangerous substances such as
those that are Wed; persistent or bioaccumulative.""
The commentary states that the obligation to "reduce and control" pollution
relates to existing pollution, an obligation reflecting state practice. It explains:
This practice indicates a general willingness to tolerate even appreciable
pollution harm, provided - and this is an important proviso - that the
watercourse State of origin is making its best efforts to reduce the pollution
to a mutually acceptable level. A requirement that existing pollution
causing such harm be abated immediately could, in some cases, result in
undue hardship, especially where the detriment to the watercourse State of
origin was grossly disproportionate to the benefit that would accrue to the
watercourse State experiencing the harm. On the other hand, failure of the
watercourse State of origin to exercise due diligence in reducing the
pollution to acceptable levels would entitle the affected State to claim that
the State of origin had breached its obligation to do so."2
In 1988, Special Rapporteur Professor Stephen McCaffrey had, in his fourth
report,' canvassed the pertinent state practice, the work of the Institute of
International Law, and the publicists' writings in support of the proposition stated here
that if the watercourse state of origin is making "its best efforts to reduce the pollution to
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a mutually acceptable level," state practice shows "a general willingness to tolerate even
appreciable pollution harm."
The "due diligence standard to prohibit pollution generated lively discussion at
the Commission's fortieth session in 1988 when the members debated the earlier version
of the draft articles on pollution and on states' obligation concerning impermissible
pollution.114 Some members criticized the concept on the ground that it was imprecise,
"too weak and too subjective,"1 " because it placed a heavy burden on the victim's state
to prove that the state of origin had not exercised due diligence." 6 Views were also
expressed supporting the strict liability standard as well."7
The Special Rapporteur, however, convinced the members that "due diligence"
was the proper standard because it was flexible and it had considerable support in state
practice. In his words, under the standard,
a watercourse State would be internationally responsible for appreciable
pollution harm to another watercourse State only if it had failed to exercise
due diligence to prevent harm. In other words, the harm must be the
result of a failure to fulfil the obligation of prevention. Mere failure to
exercise due diligence, without appreciable harm to another watercourse
State, would not entail responsibility, because what was involved in such a
case was an obligation of result, not of conduce's
On the question of responsibility, he convinced the members that "it touched on
the topics of State responsibility and liability for acts not prohibited by international
law,' two topics also Under discussion at the International Law Commission. He said
23
that "there was little, if any, evidence of State practice that recognized strict liability for
	 rm
pollution damage that was non-accidental or did not result from a dangerous activity --
which matters properly fell within the scope of [ILC's discussions on those other
topics]."'
In the same vein, article 1(c) of 1LA's 1982 Rules on Water Pollution in an
International Drainage Basin obligates states to "attempt to further reduce any [existing]
water pollution to the lowest level that is practicable and reasonable under the
circumstances."' The commentary to that article states:
By paragraph (c) of this new Article 1, legal pressure is put on states to
do more than meet the bare minimum level of pollution required by the
"substantial injury" standard. The paragraph imposes the obligation on
states to attempt to reduce water pollution below that level to the extent
that is practicable and reasonable under the circumstances to do so. This is
a weak obligation, but it is not without value. By providing some leverage
against states, it will promote the ultimate aim of eliminating pollution that
is harmful to health or property or that disturbs the ecological balance or
adversely affects the environment."
The ELC commentary to article 21 appropriately adds that pollution below the
threshold prescribed in article 21(2) for state obligation to prevent it, Le_t, pollution which
"may cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States or their environment," may still
be covered either by the article 20 obligation to protect and preserve the ecosystem of
international watercourses, or by the article 23 obligation to protect and preserve the
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marine environment, including estuaries.123
4. Obligation to Act "Individually or Jointly"
As to the states' obligation to act "individually or jointly" and to take measures to
"harmonize their policies" so as to prevent, reduce and control water pollution, the
commentary refers to the general obligations contained in draft article 5 (on equitable
and reasonable utilization and participation) and draft article 8 (on cooperation). Thus,
"Woint and cooperative action is to be taken where appropriate, and such action is to be
taken on an equitable basis."
The obligation pertaining to the harmonization of the relevant policies and
standards of watercourse states is supported by state practice. The commentary refers to
several international agreements embodying this obligation, irrespective of the parties'
varied concerns concerning certain specific subjects, such as the protection of fisheries,
the prevention of adverse effects upon certain uses, or the setting of water quality
standards and objectives.' The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also
prescribes a similar obligation.126
If watercourse states adopt varied policies or standards regarding the pollution of
international watercourses which diverge -- some being less stringent than others -- they
are likely to result in conflicts between and among watercourse states. As the
commentary explains, the conflicts may arise in the case of contiguous watercourses, lakes
or aquifers straddling boundaries, and among upstream and downstream states as well.
Harmonization of the watercourse states' policies and standards concerning water
pollution 'will help to Mitigate or avoid these problems.' Thus, the duty to
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harmonize the policies of watercourse States means that they "are to work together in
good faith to achieve and maintain" such harmonization. The duty is not to formulate
and apply identical policies, but to avoid or remove their conflicts. 128 Since these draft
articles are aimed at encouraging cooperative action to combat watercourse pollution,
this obligation is an essential one appropriately included here.
S. The Duty to Consult
The duty to consult is contained in paragraph 3 of article 21. It obligates
watercourse states to consult "at the request of any of them, ... with a view to
establishing lists of substances, the introduction of which into the waters of an
international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored." There
is a long-established state practice of establishing lists of such substances which are "toxic,
persistent or bioaccumulative," and are especially dangerous and of long-lasting
nature.129
There was considerable discussion on this subject at the fortieth session of the
Commission in 1988. Th° It was proposed that mention should be made of international
organs of cooperation, for it was not sufficient to provide for cooperation at the request
of a watercourse state. 131 As to the suggestion for the development of an international
standard to draw up the lists, the Special Rapporteur
drew attention to the list of environmentally harmful chemical substances
and the definition of "hazardous wastes" prepared by UNEP. It might be
possible to stipulate that the lists must be drawn up in accordance with
internationally accepted standards, such as those contained in the 1973 and
1978 MARPOL Conventions and in the 1974 Paris Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources.'
He paid that there was "very little authority" in state practice for a provision to
ban the introduction of toxic substances in an international watercourse, although be
"could agree with those members" who suggested that this be done. He suggested that
specific agreements could cover such a prohibition, since the identification of the banned
substances might vary with each watercourse system. As an alternative approach he
suggested a provision on the model of principle 8(d) of the set of principles adopted by
in 1987 by ECE on cooperation in the field of transboundary waters.' 33 Model
principle 8(d) provides
In the prevention and control of transboundary water pollution, special
attention should be paid to hazardous substances, especially those which
are toxic, persistent and bioaccumulative, whose introduction into
transboundary waters should be prohibited or at least prevented by using
the best available technology; such pollutants should be eliminated within a
reasonable period of time."
The drafting committee left the essence of the originally drafted article intact with one
change under which it separated the introduction of species into a new article, article 22,
which is next the subject of the comments here.
C. ARTICLE 22
Article 22 states that watercourse states "shall take all measures necessary to
prevent the introduction of species, alien or new, into an international watercourse which
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may have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse resulting in appreciable
harm to other watercourse States."
, The commentary accompanying this article explains that this new article was
added to fill a gap left by the definition of pollution in article 21, since that definition did
not include biological alterations. Under this article, watercourse states are obligated to
take "all measures necessary" to prevent the introduction of alien or new species into an
international watercourse.
The obligation to prevent is aimed at the introduction of such species which may
detrimentally affect the ecosystem of the watercourse, and the threshold is reached when
"appreciable harm" to other watercourse states results. The obligation is that of due
diligence. Thus all that is required of a watercourse state is to do "all that can
reasonably be expected to prevent the introduction of such species."
First, as noted in the commentary, the introduction of such species
of flora or fauna into a watercourse can upset its ecological balance and
result in serious problems including the clogging of intakes and machinery,
the spoling of recreation, the acceleration of eutrophication, the disruption
of food webs, the elimination of other, often valuable species, and the
transmission of disease. Once introduced, alien and new species can be
highly difficult to eradicate.136
It must be the growing awareness of this danger to which can be attributed a
trend in international conservation agreements to provide for the control of both the
deliberate and accidental introduction of such species. WCED's experts group cited the
rm,
examples of 1976 Asia Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific and
the 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitats.137 The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention specifically provides that states "shall
take all necessary mea.sures to prevent, reduce and control ... the intentional or
accidental introduction of species, alien or new, which may cause significant and harmful
changes thereto.'
Second, the commentary clarifies certain terms, such as "alien" referring to non-
native species, and "new" encompassing species produced or altered through biological
engineering. 139 As the article addresses the introduction of such species only in the
watercourse itself, fish farming or other activites conducted outside the watercourse are
not covered.
Anticipating the inquiry as to a state's obligation to prevent any alien or new
species entering into the watercourse as a result of such activites, the commentary adds
in a footnote that la]ppropriate precautionary measures may be required," to prevent
this from happening.'" This explanation is unnecessarily confusing. Does not a state's
obligation to take the necessary measures to prevent the introduction of such species into
the watercourse cover both the "direct" and "indirect" introduction of such species? If so,
why give this "indirect" introduction obligation an appearance of an after thought?
Third, the legal obligation in article 22 is kept in harmony with the general rule in
article 7 pertaining to a watercourse state's obligation not to cause "appreciable harm" to
other watercourse states. What is contemplated is the inclusion of the environment of
such states as well. Also, as in prior articles, both individual and joint preventive action
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may be called for."'
Two points seem pertinent. One, it is not clear as to when a "detrimental" effect
is to be determined. Some effects will not be seen or evidenced immediately. Second,
since such species may severely disrupt the ecosystem of the watercourse as of a
watercourse state, this is one article where the Commission's task of providing
"progressive development of international law" should lead it to explore seriously the use
of strict liability.
D. ARTICLE 23 
Watercourse States shall, individually or jointly, take all measures with respect to
an international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the maine
environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international
rules and standards.
At the 1988 session of the International Law Commission when the initial Draft of
this article, which then constituted paragraph 2 of aticle 7, a suggestion was made by Mr.
Yanko for a separate article on the subject."2 He offered two reasons for his
suggestion: (1) "to bring out the question involved," and (2) "because the main sources of
the marine environment were rivers, canals and like, and because the provision should
state the obligation of State to take all appropriate measures to protect the marine
environment, including estuaries or mouths of rivers which flowed directly into the
sea."3
The Special Rapporteur accepted the suggestion,'" as he did some other
suggestions, such as adding the words "and preserve" between "protect" and the "marine
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environment," specially referring to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
providing that the mouths of rivers were covered."5
The commentary refers to the pertinent provisions of the 1982 U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Seal," and to several regional seas conventions which recognize state
obligation not to cause pollution damage to the marine environment from land-based
sources. 147 His commentary explains that state obligation under this article is
separate from, and additional to, the obligations set forth in articles 20 to
22. Thus a watercourse State could conceivably damage an estuary through
pollution of an international watercourse without breaching its obligation
not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States. Article 23
would require the former watercourse State to take the measures necessary
to protect and preserve the estuary.'"
The commentary also explains that the phrase "generally accepted international
rules and standards"
refers both to rules of general international law and to those derived from
international agreements, as well as to standards adopted by States and
international organizations pursuant to those agreements. Watercourse
States are to take these rules and standards into account in planning and
implementing the measures to be taken under the present article, with a
view to ensuring that such measures are consistent with any applicable rules
and standards gdyenling protection and preservation of the marine
environment.'
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Even if the article were, to a large extent, to be viewed as a reaffirmation of the
existing state obligations under prior conventions, its inclusion as a separate article is a
recognition of how serious the adverse effects of the pollution of international
watercourses can be on the marine environment. The article also attempts to harmonize
the law of international watercourses and the law of the sea on this important subject.
E. ARTICLE 24
Article 24 addresses prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions by
watercourse states. This article originally was proposed in 1988, together with article 25,
as part of a draft article addressing "pollution or environmental emergencies." 3° As a
result of discussion of that draft, the Special Rapporteur split the article into its present
form, a form which was initially adopted by the ILC in 1990.th The obligation
contained in article 24 to prevent and mitigate harmful conditions was not explicitly
addressed in that earlier draft, and so remains relatively unexplored as to its implications.
For example, the WCED Legal Experts on Environmental Law did not include
such an "anticipatory" article in their legal principles on environmental protection and
sustainable development. 52 They did, however, include a more cumbersome version of
article 25 dealing with emergencies. Yet that article requires either "a significant risk" of
harm or the actual "causing [of] substantial harm," in a manner analagous to article 25 of
the ILC's 1991 draft articles, discussed below.
Article 24 mandates that watercourse states "shall .. . take all appropriate
measures to prevent or mitigate conditions that may be harmful to other watercourse
States?' As discussed by the ILC, the reason for the mandatory nature of the language is
(Th
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that "there is no doubt that [the problems addressed by the article] are of serious
consequence for watercourse States.""3
The mandatory nature of the article is softened by the qualification that the
watercourse State need only "take all appropriate measures." The ILC makes clear that
"all appropriate measures" means that watercourse states "are to take measures that are
tailored to the situation involved, and that are reasonable in view of the circumstances of
the watercourse State in question."' As a consequence, the analysis of what the
appropriate measures are will, necessarily, focus on the specific factual context. A
balancing between the seriousness and magnitude of the harmful condition with the
capabilities of the watercourse State appears to be called for by the ILC in determining
what the appropriate measures might be.
The ILC describes the standard to be used to determine the obligation arising
under this article in two slightly differing fashions. First, the ILC states that "all
appropriate measures" means "reasonable in view of the circumstances," before going on
to articulate a slightly higher standard: "[t]he obligation is [to] exercise [the watercourse
State's] best efforts.'" Presumably, these standards are to fit together in a
complementary fashion, such that, based upon a particular set of circumstances, a given
watercourse state is obligated to exercise its best efforts.
The appropriate measures called for in article 24 are to be directed towards
preventing or mitigating the conditions that may be harmful. The commentary highlights
the fact that the verbs "prevent" and "mitigate" are "of an anticipatory nature."" The
article reinforces the anticipatory nature of the obligation by including language that
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requires some measure of risk assessment by watercourse states. The article states that
	 (Th
the conditions for which watercourse states shall take all appropriate measures to prevent
or mitigate are those "that may be harmful." Certainty is not required before the
obligation arises.
Although the commentary does not address this issue, presumably the level of
harm which triggers the obligation must rise to the level of "appreciable harm" that is
used elsewhere in the draft articles. The ILC makes clear that the source of the harm,
whether naturally caused or related to human conduct, does not obviate the obligation,
stating "Rpm conditions dealt with in article 24 may result from natural causes, human
conduct, or a combination of the two."' As examples, the ILC notes that floods and
siltation may result from deforestation coupled with heavy rains or a flood may be caused
by earthquake damage to a dam.' Furthermore, the TLC notes that the examples
	 PTh
listed in the article are intended to be just that, stating: "[t]he list of conditions provided
at the end of the article is non-exhaustive.""
Finally, the article leaves the kinds of appropriate measures that shall be
undertaken undefined. The commentary on article 24 states in paragraph (5) that these
measures "are many and varied. They range from the regular and timely exchange of
data and information ... to taking all reasonable steps to ensure that activites ... are so
conducted as not to cause conditions that may be harmful to other watercourse States."
In so providing this flexibility, the ILC has again emphasized the contextual nature of the
obligation laid down in this article.
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F. ARTICLE 25 
The bulk of article 25 addresses those instances where the anticipatory prevention
and mitigation called thr in article 24 have not been effective, resulting in an "emergency"
that "causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse States
or other states." As the ILC notes, the obligation contained in the first three paragraphs
of article 25 call for responsive action, rather than anticipatory action.'
The article is divided into four paragraphs, with the first devoted to a definition of
the term "emergency," the second and third addressing responses to emergencies and the
fourth focusing on contingency planning for emergencies. Paragraph 1 of article 25
defines the term "emergency," as quoted above. The ILC points out that "[t]he
seriousness of the harm involved, together with the suddenness of the emergency's
occurrence, justifies the measures required by [paragraphs 2 and 3 of] the article."161
As did article 24, paragraph 1 of article 25 also makes clear that the source of the
emergency, whether from natural causes or human conduct, does not change the
obligations laid down in the article.
What is not made clear in paragraph 1, nor in the commentary, is whether the
definition of emergency provided would include emergencies that are not related to the
international watercourse, but which, nonetheless, cause or pose an imminent threat of
causing serious harm to watercourse States or other States. The example which comes to
mind is Chernobyl, where the radioactive fallout was transported primarily through the
atmosphere and not by water. While the intent of article 25 seems to be to address
water-borne harms, the literal reading of the language of article 25 would seem to allow
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its application to harms transported by other mediums. 162 Such an expansive reading of
the article would need to be carefully coordinated with other applicable international
agreements.
Indeed, a review of the ILC discussion of the original draft of this article makes
clear that the ILC intended an expansive reading of the term "emergency". The Special
Rapporteur, in summarizing the discussion of the original draft language "noted that most
speakers had agreed that a comprehensive article dealing with all kinds of emergency
situations, not only those related to the environment, should be included:1'
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 25 set forth the specific measures which result from
the obligation laid down by the article. Paragraph 2, which addresses the notification
requirement, provides that "[a] watercourse State shall, without delay and by the most
expeditious means available, notify other potentially affected States and competent
international organizations of any emergency originating within its territory." As the IC
points out, "[t]he words 'without delay' mean immediately upon learning of the
emergency, and the phrase Thy the most expeditious means available' means that the
most rapid means of communication that is accessible is to be utilized."' Significantly,
paragraph 2 of article 25 also extends the obligation of who must be notified beyond
watercourse States to non-watercourse States and "competent international
organizations."
While paragraph 2 addresses the manner of notification, paragraph 3 of article 25
delineates the nature of the measures required to be undertaken in the event of an
emergency. The language in paragraph 3 which accomplishes this states that a
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watercourse state shall take "immediately all practicable measures necessitated by the
circumstances." The MC clarifies that "all practicable measures" means "those that are
feasible, workable and reasonable.1165 As with article 24, these measures are to be
contextually defined by "the factual situation of the emergency and its possible effect
upon other States.""
The final paragraph of article 25 is of an anticipatory nature, as opposed to the
responsive character noted above for the first three paragraphs of the article. This
paragraph lays down the obligation of watercourse States, "where necessary," to "develop
contingency plans for responding to emergencies". The TLC clarifies the qualifying
phrase 'when necessary," stating,
that the circumstances of some watercourse States and international
watercourses my not justify the effort and expenses that are involved in
the development of contingency plans. Whether such plans would be
necessary would l ! depend, for example, upon whether the characteristics of
the natural environment of the watercourse, and the uses made of the
watercourse and adjacent land areas, would indicate that it was possible for
emergencies to arise.167
This qualification is not intended as an excuse for not undertaking the contingency
planning, as the ELC noterthat with respect to most international watercourses in the




Article 29 reads: "International watercourses and related installations, facilities and
other works shall enjoy the protection accorded by the principles and rules of
international law applicable in international and internal armed conflict and shall not be
used in violation of those principles and rules."
As the commentary states, the article does not amend or alter existing law; its
principal function is to remind states that the law of armed conflicts applies both to the
protection of international watercourses and works and to their use.'" The article is
addressed to all states, not just watercourse states. However, it "does not purport to
extend the application of any instrument to States not parties to that instrument."'
The commentary illustrates how the rules and principles governing armed conflict
are applicable under the article. It specifically refers to the 1907 Hague Conventions,
pertinent articles of the 1977 Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and in cases not covered by a specific rule, to the protections afforded
under the "Martens Clause."
Assuming that the provisions of this article were included in a framework
convention to which Iraq was a party, and assuming further that Iraq had also acceeded
to the 1977 Protocols, Iraq would have been in breach of its obligations under this article
by its having caused massive oil spills in the Gulf." The article, however, does not
purport to add anything substantive or procedural to Iraq's obligations for its conduct or
for the result of such conduct.
Granted that the subject is of "signal importance," as the commentary states."
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However, one has to question the usefulness of including this article in this framework
convention.
III. CONCLUSION
(A 2 to 3 page appraisal of the ILC contribution toward "progressive development
of international law" on the subject will constitute the concluding part.)
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